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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The Role of Metaphor in the Darwin Debates: Natural Theology, Natural Selection, and 
 
Christian Production of Counter-Metaphor. (May 2012) 
 
Juliet Joy Neumann, B.S., Texas A&M University; 
 
M.S., Baylor College of Medicine 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. C. Jan Swearingen 
 
 
 
The presence of metaphorical language in Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of 
Species has been the source of much debate, particularly in the interaction between 
Darwin’s theory and the Christian faith.  The metaphorical language used to describe 
“nature,” “evolution,” “natural theology,” and “natural selection” is examined—within 
Christianity prior to Darwin, in Darwin’s writing of the Origin, and in the responses of 
three Victorian Christian critics of science. 
“Natural selection” and “evolution” had metaphorical meanings prior to 
Darwin’s use of these terms.  “Nature” was a highly metaphysical concept, described by 
the metaphor of natural theology.  “Evolution” was associated with epic understandings 
of human progress.  The metaphor of natural theology was particularly important to the 
faith of Western Christians by the time of Darwin.  In order to better understand the role 
of natural theology, the theories of metaphor developed by Kenneth Burke in “Four 
Master Tropes” and by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in Metaphors We Live By are 
compared.  This comparison results in the development of an expansion of Lakoff and 
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Johnson’s metaphor theory, a model termed experienced metaphor.  This model is used 
to explain Victorian Christians’ emotional adherence to natural theology. 
 Many of the interpreters of Darwin’s work, both secular and Christian, saw 
natural selection as a rival to natural theology.  The works of three prominent Victorians 
who attempted to defend natural theology against the apparent onslaughts of science are 
evaluated for additional metaphorical language regarding nature and evolution.  Philip 
Gosse, G. K. Chesterton, and Charles Spurgeon each produced counter-metaphors to 
defend natural theology—metaphors of awe/wonder and of sin/destruction.  The 
rhetorical effects of these counter-metaphors promote the rejection of Darwin’s theory of 
evolution. 
 The counter-metaphors identified are still in circulation within the debate over 
Darwin and Christianity today.   The presence of metaphor in this debate deserves 
greater attention, in order to understand how metaphor affects the thinking of both 
Christian and secular audiences regarding Darwinian evolution.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The metaphorical language of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species has been a 
subject of much debate, among scientists, and between proponents of Darwinian 
evolution and defenders of Christian faith.  While Darwin’s idea of natural selection was 
novel from a scientific standpoint, the metaphorical language he used to describe his 
idea was based on long-held ideas of “nature” and “evolution” that already had 
metaphorical meanings.  Nature was understood by the majority of Darwin’s audience to 
be the realm that revealed God’s purpose, goodness, and design, while evolution was 
associated with progression or unfolding, particularly of human culture.  To many in 
Darwin’s audience, the anthropomorphic images suggested by the metaphors of natural 
selection and evolution as developmental process were problematic because they seemed 
to grant selecting powers to nature.  The interpretation of natural selection as an alternate 
chooser or selector of the apparent design in the world caused many to take natural 
selection to be a rival description of nature that threatened natural theology (cf. Young 
Darwin’s Metaphor, Ruse Evolution-Creation).   
Many Christians who saw natural selection as a rival to natural theology 
attempted to defend natural theology against the apparent onslaughts of evolution.  This 
study looks at attempts to defend natural theology through the production of counter-
metaphors, which oppose the ideas associated with natural selection and evolution.  An 
evaluation of the works of three prominent Victorian Christians, Philip Gosse, G. K.  
_____________ 
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Chesterton, and Charles Spurgeon, reveals two categories of counter-metaphors used to  
defend natural theology: metaphors of awe and wonder associated with nature, and 
metaphors of sin and destruction associated with evolution.  The language of the 
counter-metaphors reveals the thinking of nineteenth century critics regarding natural 
selection and evolution, and these counter-metaphors continue to be prominent in 
debates over evolution and Christianity today.  In particular, the metaphors of sin and 
destruction, produced by Spurgeon, pictured evolution as a “doorway to destruction” that 
must be sealed off in order to maintain safety.  Spurgeon’s metaphor suggests a 
prohibition on the contemplation of evolution, and the metaphor thus encourages the 
idea of an irresolvable difference between Darwinian evolution and the Christian faith.   
I begin my study with a brief history of Christian understandings of figurative 
language and metaphor.  I then place particular emphasis on the presence of metaphor 
within Western Christianity concerning creation, nature, and natural theology during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, leading up to the time of Darwin.  In order to further 
clarify the importance of natural theology within the Victorian Christian community, I 
next consider two rhetorical theories, by Kenneth Burke and by George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson.  Based on a comparison of these two theories I develop my own expansion of 
Lakoff/Johnson called experienced metaphor.  This expanded model is used to evaluate 
the emotional responses of Darwin’s audience to the metaphorical language surrounding 
natural theology.  In the following section, I consider Darwin’s inclusion of metaphors in 
the Origin—including natural selection, evolution, and survival of the fittest—as well as 
criticisms leveled at his use of metaphorical terms.  Next, I look at the defense of natural 
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theology by Gosse, Chesterton, and Spurgeon.  These Christian critics produced counter-
metaphors of awe/wonder in relation to nature and of sin/destruction in relation to 
evolution.  Through a close reading their texts, I consider how their metaphorical 
language encourages Christian rejection of any ideas—particularly Darwinian 
evolution— that seem to threaten natural theology.  Finally, I consider how the counter-
metaphors identified in this study, particularly evolution is a doorway to destruction, 
which is seen in the work of Spurgeon, are present in the ongoing debate within 
Christianity over Darwin and evolution.  
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II. CHRISTIAN VIEWS ON METAPHOR: NATURE, CREATION, AND 
NATURAL THEOLOGY 
In this section I consider the prominence of metaphor in the description of nature 
within Christianity prior to Darwin.  First, I present a brief history of the role of 
metaphor and other figurative language within Christianity.  This history provides 
important perspective to the Darwin debates, showing that at the time that Darwin 
presented his own metaphorical ideas there was something of a “metaphorical crisis” 
within the larger Christian community.  Next, I look at one of the most prominent 
examples of metaphor within Western Christianity, the metaphorical view of nature 
described by natural theology.  Though natural theology was formulated in Christianity 
as early as St. Augustine, it developed into a paradigm that was crucial to the faith of 
many Christians in the nineteenth century.  Following this introduction to natural 
theology, I present two theoretical models on metaphor that I use to more fully 
understand the metaphor of natural theology.  Through a comparison and contrast of the 
metaphor theories of Kenneth Burke in “Four Master Tropes” and of George Lakoff and 
Mark Johnson in Metaphors We Live By, I propose an expanded version of the theory of 
Lakoff/Johnson, called experienced metaphor, which helps to explain the emotional 
impact of the metaphorical language surrounding natural theology.   
The History of Metaphor in Christianity 
As a religion based on a written Scripture containing figurative language, 
Christian scholars have had to give account for metaphorical and other figurative 
language from the earliest time in Christian history.  The Biblical books consist of a 
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wide variety of genres which employ metaphors and other tropes to varying degrees.  
Figurative language in Scripture has proved problematic for some within Christianity 
over the centuries.  Christians have long debated issues over which passages should be 
taken figuratively, what authority figurative language holds, and how metaphorical or 
allegorical passages are to be interpreted and applied.  While it is beyond the scope of 
this study to provide a detailed historical account of the views on metaphor within 
Christianity, a brief sketch provides important background information. 
Discussion on figurative language began early in Christian history.  In On 
Christian Doctrine, St. Augustine states that “the ambiguities of metaphorical words . . . 
demand no ordinary care and diligence” in the interpretation of Scripture (Doctrine 85).  
Despite his recognition that metaphorical interpretation is difficult, Augustine teaches 
that such figurative language is able to “lift the eye of the mind above what is corporeal 
and created, that it may drink in eternal light” (Doctrine 86).  Augustine recognizes that 
figurative language, which he refers to as “signs,” can be misinterpreted and lead to 
error.  However, he insists that the Christian “who does not understand what a sign 
signifies, but yet knows that it is a sign, is not in bondage” (Doctrine 89).  The mere 
recognition that the language is figurative frees the reader from danger.  For Augustine, 
signs, including metaphors, can bring great spiritual insight.  Augustine’s endorsement 
of figurative interpretation of Scripture would eventually be formulated into four distinct 
levels of Scripture interpretation: literal, allegorical/typological, moral, and spiritual.  
Based on the prominent teaching of these four levels of interpretation within medieval 
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theology, interpretations of Scripture in the centuries after Augustine were often highly 
figurative or symbolic. 
 In Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas was not as positive about metaphors as 
Augustine had been.  In his history of rhetoric, George Kennedy explains that Aquinas 
thought of metaphor merely as “a device of poetry, which he calls the least of all the 
sciences” (219).  According to Kennedy, Aquinas concluded that Scripture employed 
metaphor only because “sacred doctrine required the truth to be veiled as an exercise for 
thoughtful minds and as a defense against the ridicule of unbelievers” (Kennedy 219).  
In Aquinas’ view, metaphor is a concession—not illuminating but actually obscuring 
meaning.  God included metaphor within Scripture as a means to challenge our 
otherwise spiritually idle minds and for the protection of the gospel against its enemies.  
We can see a shift from the positive view of metaphor espoused by Augustine to the 
more negative approach of Aquinas. 
 The preface to John Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress, written in 1678, indicates 
that the Christian viewpoint on figurative language continued the uneasy relationship 
expressed by Aquinas.  Bunyan wrote his introductory “The Author’s Apology for his 
Book” (v) at the beginning of Pilgrim’s Progress because of criticism he had received 
about the allegorical nature of his work.  Bunyan relays that opponents had urged him to 
speak plainly, for “Metaphors make us blind” (viii).  This criticism results in Bunyan’s 
defense of his allegory and of figurative language in general, which he argues was the 
very way in which God first introduced “His Gospel-Laws,” through Old Testament 
“Types, Shadows  and Metaphors” (viii).  Bunyan admits that figurative language can be 
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difficult to understand, calling his work “My dark and cloudy words,” but he insists that 
“they do but hold/ The Truth, as Cabinets inclose (sic) the Gold” (ix).  Again, Bunyan 
reminds his readers that this is the pattern of Scripture itself, which is “In every where so 
full of all these things, / (Dark Figures, Allegories)” (ix).  Bunyan’s defense of his own 
work, and his reminder that Scripture is filled with figurative language, suggests that 
many of his contemporaries in the seventeenth century were growing increasingly 
intolerant of figurative language in religious matters. 
The Protestant Reformation instigated much of the decreasing tolerance for 
figurative language within Christianity.  In his history of the Reformation, Alister 
McGrath notes that for Protestants there was an “absence of any authoritative interpreter 
of scripture that could give rulings on contested matters of biblical interpretation” (70).  
Early reformers assumed that this would not be a problem because they insisted that the 
Bible would be interpreted uniformly.  The Swiss reformer Huldrych Zwingli “argued 
for the capacity of the Bible to interpret itself lucidly and unambivalently in all matters 
of importance” (McGrath 69).  Experience proved that this was not the case.  As soon as 
the central authority of the Pope and ruling Church councils was abolished, rival 
interpretations of Scripture spread rapidly.  Denominations were formed largely on the 
basis of these differing Biblical interpretations.  Many of these denominations did retain 
some level of authority structure, even if it was not explicitly noted.  Authority came in 
the form of a strong founding personality, such as Martin Luther and John Calvin, who 
determined Biblical interpretation for their followers.  These founding personalities 
settled how the Bible was to be interpreted within their denominational group—
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especially in terms of figurative language, symbolism, and other contested matters of 
language.  Subsequent Protestant groups did not always have such a strong authority 
figure on which to base their hermeneutic.  For these later groups, rejection of figurative 
interpretations of the Bible became increasingly important.  The simple, literal sense of 
the words of the Bible—what is commonly called Biblical literalism— became the only 
available authority to those who recognized no human authority.  The rejection of human 
authority was particularly prominent for evangelical Protestants.  Karen Armstrong, in 
The Case for God, notes that many evangelicals, especially in America, eventually 
developed a Biblical literalism that was “unparalleled” (xv) in the history of Biblical 
hermeneutics and were “taught to look for the plain sense of scripture” (248), so that for 
many the idea of figurative interpretation had become essentially obsolete.   
The problem concerning figurative language in Christianity would only intensify 
for some Christians in the nineteenth century.  The long-standing debate over figurative 
language in Scripture reached new height after the introduction of Higher Criticism by 
German scholars.  Higher Critics extended the figurative reading of Scripture into the 
Gospel descriptions of the life and death of Jesus, which caused unprecedented anxiety 
for many.  Many of these Christians, in reaction to the claims of Higher Criticism, 
insisted on ever-increasingly literal interpretations of the entire Bible, even those 
passages that had previously been universally accepted as figurative.  The idea of 
figurative interpretations became associated, for some, with liberal, and even apostate, 
positions on Christianity. 
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 Disagreement regarding metaphor in Christian language did not end in the 
nineteenth century.  The representative positions of twentieth century commentators 
Dorothy L. Sayers and C. S. Lewis on the one hand and the theologian Gordon Clark on 
the other illustrate the ongoing Christian debate over metaphor.   
Sayers, in The Mind of the Maker, insists that the Christian cannot comprehend 
God without the use of figurative language.  As Sayers explains it, “The fact is, that all 
language about everything is analogical; we think in a series of metaphors” (23).  The 
dependence on metaphor for thought and language is particularly true of language about 
God, of whom “we have no direct experience” (Sayers 23).  Sayers is willing to admit 
that it “may be perilous, as it must be inadequate, to interpret God by analogy with 
ourselves,” but she concludes that “we are compelled to do so; we have no other means 
of interpreting anything” (23).  Sayers not only accepts figurative language when it 
comes to spiritual matters, but insists on it.  In a similar way, C. S. Lewis agrees that 
metaphors are necessary for religious language: “The truth is if we are going to talk at all 
about things which are not perceived by the senses, we are forced to use language 
metaphorically” (Lewis 88).  Peter W. Macky explains that for Lewis, metaphorical 
language in Scripture is “the means by which we can ‘see God’s face and live’” (239).  
Lewis insists that figurative language within Christianity expresses Truth in a way that 
no other language can.  Lewis and Sayers represent the view that metaphors within 
Scripture are purposefully figurative, and should be interpreted as such.  Figurative 
language, and metaphor specifically, is indispensable when speaking about spiritual 
matters, which transcend our empirical experiences. 
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 The approach to Scriptural metaphors by the theologian Gordon Clark, in 
Language and Theology, presents the other end of the spectrum.  Though Clark was not 
contemporary with C. S. Lewis, Peter W. Macky contrasts the theories of Clark and 
Lewis as representatives of two dichotomous views on language and Christianity.  
Macky explains that for Clark, metaphor and analogy are “essentially ornamental or 
decorative, not types of speech that are essential to Christian speaking about God” (239).  
Instead, Clark insists that the scientific language of geometry is the standard for the 
expression of thought (Macky 240), so that “it is necessary to translate metaphors into 
clear literal propositions”—the language of geometrical proofs—“before they become 
useful for [spiritual] thought” (Macky 241).  Clark argues that Biblical metaphors are 
inadequate for understanding until they are translated into something more concrete.  
Metaphors and other Biblical figurative language are actually only “containers of God’s 
Word (meaning) rather than that Word itself” (Macky 242).  Hence, according to Clark, 
no language in the Bible should be taken figuratively.  Those passages or images that 
appear to be figurative require translation into the True literal explanation before they 
can be useful. 
 As will be discussed in greater detail, the language and ideas surrounding 
Darwinian evolution were highly metaphorical.  Natural selection, evolution, and even 
nature itself were all concepts invested with a great deal of metaphorical meaning.  In 
order to rightly understand what Darwin was saying and how it applied to matters of 
faith, Christians would need to interact with metaphorical images and consider how they 
functioned in the spiritual realm.  Some Christians were able to accomplish this with 
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relative ease.  By the time of Darwin, another significant portion of Christians had lost 
the understanding of how to deal with figurative language in relation to their faith and 
were intolerant of such language in spiritual matters.  The changing historical attitude 
within Christianity toward figurative language in spiritual matters left many Christians 
unprepared to adequately contend with the complex notions regarding nature that were 
present in the metaphor of natural selection. 
Though a significant portion of Western Christians developed decreasing 
tolerance for figurative or metaphorical language in the interpretation of Scripture, 
paradoxically their understandings of nature were highly metaphorical.  For the majority 
of Darwin’s Christian audience, nature was understood through the metaphor of natural 
theology.  I will next consider the importance of natural theology within Western 
thought. 
Natural Theology 
The concept of nature within Western Christianity had been associated with 
theological understandings of God for centuries prior to Darwin.  This idea can be seen 
in the teachings of Jesus when he directs his listeners in the Sermon on the Mount to 
“consider the lilies of the field” in order to understand God’s character of providential 
provision (Matt 6:28).  Early in Christian history Augustine extended this idea, teaching 
believers to view nature as revealing God as much as Scripture did.  From these early 
ideas of nature as a source of knowledge about God, or as ultimately more about the 
metaphysical than the physical realm, natural theology became the dominant means by 
which to understand nature.  Following in the ideas set forth by Augustine, Francis 
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Bacon had advocated in The Advancement of Learning that nature was “the book of 
God’s works” (10), capable of standing beside “the book of God’s word,” or Scripture, 
for knowledge of God.  Bacon was advocating greater attention to empirical observation 
and scientific inquiry, but he still does so within the system that suggests that it will 
teach one about the true nature of God.  Bacon’s thought had profound influence on the 
English-speaking world, so that the idea of natural theology continued even as the 
scientific method became the accepted means of inquiry into nature.   
Natural theologians discovered apparent order, design, and purpose in the world 
as greater attention was given to the study of nature.  Thomas Jefferson and other Deists 
drew thological conclusions from nature’s order and design.  Deists believed that 
because nature was made of observable, immovable laws, this showed that the Creator 
God was not involved in the world in an ongoing way.  Jefferson’s views are revealed in 
the very language he used in the Declaration of Independence.  In speaking of “the laws 
of Nature and of Nature’s God” in order to justify the actions of the American 
revolutionaries, Jefferson suggests that nature reveals the moral code by which men are 
compelled to live.  Within this realm, “Nature” is a metaphor for fixed moral laws, 
which can be seen by everyone and need no special revelation.    
Other natural theologians had a different interpretation of the design of nature.  
In 1809 William Paley brought his arguments on natural theology to a Victorian 
audience.  In Natural Theology, or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the 
Deity, Paley argues that nature reveals a purpose, which necessitates a purposeful agent 
responsible for the observable details.  Paley compares nature to the intricacies of a 
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watch, the mechanism of which shows not just order, but purposeful design with a 
certain teleological end.  Paley insists that “[e]very manifestation of design, which 
existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature; with the difference, on the side of 
nature, of being greater and more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation” 
(18).  As opposed to the Deists, Paley’s view of nature revealed a God who worked 
purposefully within nature in order to produce certain pre-ordained ends.  Nature is in 
the hands of and is guided by God.  Through his comparison of nature with a watch, 
Paley gives nature a metaphorical meaning in which it is a valuable possession that can 
give assurance of God’s presence and beneficent work in the world.  Paley’s work “was 
required reading for Cambridge undergraduates and was accepted as normative by 
leading British and American scientists for over fifty years” (Armstrong 228), thus his 
view of natural theology was prominent during the nineteenth century. 
In The Case for God, Karen Armstrong traces the development of natural 
theology within the Western world, considering how and why Christianity in the West 
developed a view of nature as a Book of God’s works.  Natural theology was not just an 
issue for scholastic theologians, but came to undergird the everyday faith of all types of 
Christians.  According to Armstrong, Western philosophers increasingly sought certainty 
in matters relating to God and religion.  Armstrong posits that this desire for certainty 
resulted from an attempt to combat the religious upheaval that had ravaged Europe 
during the Thirty Years War (207).  She argues that the mathematical proofs of 
Descartes and orderly natural laws of Newton provided the type of certainty society was 
seeking.  Armstrong explains that scientific discoveries were taken by many to 
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empirically prove God’s attributes, which could be observed by all and agreed upon.  
The resultant unity regarding God’s presence and character ended any need for sectarian 
violence.   
 While Enlightenment rationalism was eventually interpreted by many to be a 
challenge to religion, the idea that natural laws proved God’s existence and showed his 
goodness remained prominent among defenders of faith.  “Scientific religion” 
(Armstrong 213), if not taken to the extreme of atheism as had been done by the 
philosophes, seemed to give confidence and authority to the teachings of Christianity.  
The “instant success and recognition in the English-speaking world” (Armstrong 227) of 
Paley’s work shows that natural theology fit well into the religious mindset of the 
Victorian culture, which wanted God to be as accessible and understandable as 
technology was becoming.  Armstrong notes that even Evangelicals, with their otherwise 
anti-intellectual bent, embraced the natural theology that came from the Enlightenment.  
For Evangelicals, “the natural laws that scientists had discovered in the universe were 
tangible demonstrations of God’s providential care and provided the faith of Jesus Christ 
with unshakeable, scientific certainty” (Armstrong 237).  Based on Armstrong’s 
description, by the nineteenth century natural theology was not merely popular but had 
become a necessary support to the faith of many.  Christians had become so accustomed 
to certainty in the area of faith that they were dependent on the idea that science proved 
their religion.  Natural theology was not merely a poetic description but had developed 
into a crucial paradigm for many Christians by the Victorian Era.   
   15
 The prominence of the metaphor of natural theology had significant impact on 
the way in which Darwin’s theory of natural selection was received.  In order to explain 
this impact, I consider the metaphor theories of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson and of 
Kenneth Burke, which I use to elaborate on the way in which natural theology 
functioned in Victorian culture.  
Lakoff and Johnson on Metaphor 
Lakoff and Johnson collaborated in Metaphors We Live By to formulate a new 
concept of metaphor, in which rather than seeing metaphor as a device to add flourish or 
persuasion, metaphor is “perhaps the key to giving an adequate account of 
understanding” (ix).  For Lakoff and Johnson, our most fundamental thought processes 
are built on metaphorical thinking.  Using linguistic evidence, they present extensive 
examples of ways in which ordinary language is built on “a metaphor we are hardly ever 
conscious of” (3).  As a primary example they explore the fact that Western culture 
speaks about argument as if it were a battle, resulting in the conceptual metaphor 
argument is war.  While we rarely overtly acknowledge this metaphor, our language 
about arguments reveals that we think, and thus speak and act, towards argument as if it 
were a battle (4).  The metaphor “is in our very concept of an argument.  The language 
of argument is not poetic, fanciful, or rhetorical; it is literal.  We talk about arguments 
that way because we think of them that way” (5).  This kind of metaphorical thinking is 
necessary because “so many of the concepts that are important to us are either abstract or 
not clearly delineated in our experience (the emotions, ideas, time, etc.)” (115). We can 
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only understand the unknown by comparing it to something already known, to see how it 
is like or unlike things we are familiar with. 
Lakoff and Johnson argue that our foundational knowledge comes from the 
experience of living in a physical body, so that it is from this experience that we produce 
metaphors.  We perceive our bodies as “entities bounded by a surface” (25) with spatial 
orientation such as “up-down, front-back, in-out, near-far, etc.” (56). The physical 
experience of having a body is the most prominent experience we have because “our 
continual everyday bodily functioning” constantly interacts with spatial orientation (56).  
Our most basic metaphorical concepts are thus compared to simple orientational 
experience.  A clear example comes in the metaphor happy is up, which belongs to the 
category Lakoff and Johnson call orientational metaphors.  The idea “happy” is abstract, 
but we have a physical experience to correlate with the emotions called “happy.”  A 
happy mood results in physical energy which enables an erect posture, whereas 
depression leads to physical lethargy that impels one to sit or lie down.  Happy is thus 
compared to up, which emerges in such language as “that boosted my spirits” or “you’re 
in high spirits” (15, emphasis original).   
Ontological metaphors are another category of metaphor that emerges from 
direct physical experience as well.  These metaphors result from our physical experience 
of being “discreet or bounded,” from which we conceive of things that are not discreet or 
bounded as if they are (25).  This gives us the ability to view “events, activities, 
emotions, ideas, etc., as entities and substances” (25).  Lakoff and Johnson give the 
example of the experience of rising prices, which is condensed into the metaphor 
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inflation is an entity.  The metaphorical understanding of rising prices offers a way of 
referring to the experience (26).  Orientational and ontological metaphors are grounded 
in direct physical experience and are the concepts “that we live by in the most 
fundamental way” (57).  In fact, we are not consciously aware that our thoughts on these 
foundational concepts are even metaphorical. 
Starting from the foundational orientational and ontological metaphors, Lakoff 
and Johnson describe increasingly complex metaphors that are developed through a 
process of metaphorical layering.  Orientational and ontological metaphors are so basic 
to our thought processes that Lakoff and Johnson admit they “are not in themselves very 
rich” (61) in terms of description.  They can be elaborated upon, however, to produce 
“structural metaphors” (61).  This process is seen in the elaboration of the ontological 
metaphor mind is an entity to the structural metaphor mind is a machine.  Mind is an 
entity emerges from the physical experience of “being bounded and set off from the rest 
of the world by the surface of our skins” so that “we experience the rest of the world as 
outside us” (29).  We project this “container” experience onto the concept “mind,” so 
that the mind is seen as a bounded entity.  Mind is a machine elaborates upon this 
container experience to give it a more specific description.  The more complex metaphor 
of the machine is not tied as directly to physical experience, but it is dependent on the 
previous existence of mind is an entity, which is derived from direct physical experience.  
Structural metaphors are a more complex layer of metaphor, not as directly tied to the 
body, but they are still tied to experience.  Mind is a machine makes no sense unless one 
has experience of what a machine is and how it functions.  Ultimately, structural 
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metaphors are also grounded in simple bodily experience, as seen in the dependence of 
mind is a machine on the ontological metaphor mind is an entity.  Continuing the process 
of layering, structural metaphors can then be connected to one another in systems of 
complex coherence (97) that add additional layers of complexity. 
Lakoff and Johnson provide an example of the “new [or poetic] metaphor” love 
is a collaborative work of art (139) to underscore that all metaphors—not just those that 
are conceptual—are ultimately grounded in physical experience.  This metaphor is based 
on the basic ontological metaphors love is an entity and work is an entity.  Both of these 
ontological metaphors are grounded in the basic physical container experience.  We 
speak about love, for example, as if it were actually a discreet entity that we can define, 
discuss, describe, and experience.  However, the concept love is actually made up of a 
whole host of abstract experiences and ideas that are brought together into the 
appearance of a discreet entity.  The idea, as argued by Lakoff and Johnson, that ethereal 
ideas can be made into such an entity comes from our bodily experience of being a 
contained unit, bound by skin that provides a boundary of me/not me.  Because we 
define the world through this universal bodily experience, we are able to propose a 
similarly bounded idea called love.  Love is a collaborative work of art, then, cannot be 
understood without this grounding of the bounded physical experience.   
In this study I undertake a theoretical expansion of Lakoff and Johnson’s work, 
which I call experienced metaphor, and apply it specifically to the metaphor of natural 
theology.  In order to develop my theoretical expansion, I will compare the metaphor 
theory of Lakoff/Johnson with that of Kenneth Burke. 
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Burke on Metaphor 
 In “Four Master Tropes,” Kenneth Burke is not concerned with how metaphors 
are produced and revealed in everyday language, as are Lakoff and Johnson, but on what 
they can and cannot do in the role of description.  Given a particular metaphor, what can 
it tell us about the concept to which it refers?  Burke explains that a metaphor offers 
merely one of many possible perspectives on a topic.  It is “a device for seeing 
something in terms of something else.  It brings out the thisness of a that, or the thatness 
of a this” (503, emphasis original).  Each of these single perspectives is necessarily 
limited, for two reasons.  First, a metaphor is a perspective of “incongruity,” for “the 
seeing of something in terms of something else involves a ‘carrying-over’ of a term from 
one realm into another, a process that necessarily involves varying degrees of 
incongruity in that the two realms are never identical” (504).  A given metaphor may tell 
us something about a topic, but that “something” reveals what the topic is not as much as 
what it is.  When two concepts are compared, we are able to see that they are alike, but 
at the same time we realize that they are not the same and appreciate their differences, as 
well.  Secondly, each perspective is limited because it is only one of many possible 
perspectives “from which [the topic] can with justice be perceived” (504).  No one 
metaphor stands as the only thing to which a concept, idea, person, or object can be 
compared.  If there can be many comparisons, there can be many perspectives.  Each 
perspective is considered not only valuable but also necessary to an understanding of the 
topic to which it refers. 
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 It could be said, based on Burke’s theory, that a properly functioning metaphor is 
to be taken provisionally.  For Burke, a metaphor does not give a complete description or 
declare Truth, but merely offers one of many possible perspectives so that “it is [only] 
by the approach through a variety of perspectives that we establish a character’s reality” 
(504).  Burke describes a process in which different perspectives be “encouraged to 
participate in an orderly parliamentary development” in order to achieve “a ‘resultant 
certainty’” about the topic to which a metaphor refers (513).  No single “‘sub-
perspective’ can be treated as either precisely right or precisely wrong” since they are 
each only one “voice” (512).  According to Burke, a metaphor is good as far as it goes, 
but must never be taken as anything more than a sub-perspective that should be included 
with a host of other perspectives. 
The metaphor theories of Burke and of Lakoff and Johnson are congruent in 
some respects.  Most prominently, both agree that a given metaphor cannot be taken as 
the single description of a subject.  For Burke, each metaphor is only one of many 
possible perspectives and therefore incomplete alone.  For Lakoff and Johnson, a 
metaphor is too culturally bound to encompass a complete idea of Truth about a subject.  
A closer look at the theories of Burke and of Lakoff and Johnson, however, reveals that 
Lakoff and Johnson’s metaphor theory puts strain on Burke’s idea of perspective. 
Lakoff and Johnson Contra Burke: Experienced Metaphor 
It is my contention that Burke’s theory of metaphor requires a high level of 
evaluative distance from a given metaphor.  His insistence on the preliminary nature of a 
single metaphor and the democratic process of including all of the available descriptions 
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of a topic requires the observer to approach a metaphor as a dispassionate critic.  While 
this process may be preferable, I take Lakoff and Johnson’s theory to suggest that 
Burke’s parliamentary process is an ideal that can prove difficult for many to achieve.  
In order to more fully develop my idea on the limited usefulness of Burke’s theory on 
metaphor, I elaborate on the theoretical implications of Lakoff and Johnson.   
In Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson are primarily concerned with 
showing that our most basic conceptual systems are metaphorical and are produced from 
bodily experience.  These metaphors are then revealed in everyday language.  In my 
application of Lakoff and Johnson, I focus on how metaphors are interpreted, rather than 
produced.  Based on Lakoff and Johnson’s theory, metaphors are necessarily interpreted 
through an ingrained system of bodily reference—necessarily, because the body is 
ultimately the grounding of every metaphor.  This system of interpretation means that in 
order to understand a given metaphor, each member of the audience will filter the 
language of the metaphor through his or her own physical experiences.  If we consider 
Lakoff and Johnson’s example of the new metaphor love is a collaborative work of art 
we can see this process of interpretation.   Interpreters of the metaphor love is a 
collaborative work of art, in an attempt to understand it, must consider what a 
collaborative work of art consists of in their physical experience.  They will think 
through their own physical experiences of art—perhaps physical trips to museums or the 
personal production of some artistic work, particularly if it were collaborative.   
Remembered experiences are not neutral; they are tied to any emotions 
connected to the memory.  We can imagine, for example, a person who was taunted for 
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lack of artistic ability during participation in some collaborative work of art as a child.  
For this person, the metaphor love is a collaborative work of art evokes remembered 
emotions of pain or embarrassment.  Another person might fondly remember a shared 
art project with a parent, and thus the metaphor will access emotions of warmth and 
security.  Interpretation of the metaphor love is a collaborative work of art ultimately 
produces an emotional response based on experience.  As will be developed later in this 
study, a similar process occurs with the metaphor of natural theology, in which the 
metaphorical images associated with natural theology evoke experiences of possessing 
valuable objects.  As will be seen, the experience of possessing something valuable is 
tied to emotions of security and comfort. 
Interpretation of the language of any metaphor follows this same process.  
Metaphors access memories of physical experiences, which can evoke associated 
emotions.  I call this process experienced metaphor.  The model of experienced 
metaphor stresses the necessary inclusion of the emotional realm in interpretation of 
metaphor and challenges Burke’s idea of the dispassionately intellectual contemplation 
of metaphor.   
Lakoff and Johnson explicitly describe some of the aspects that I have used to 
posit my model of experienced metaphor.  They admit that “the meaning a metaphor will 
have . . . will be partly culturally determined and partly tied to my past experiences” 
(142).  This corresponds to the idea that interpretations of metaphor come from 
remembered experiences.  Furthermore, Lakoff and Johnson also consider examples of 
metaphor may be “grossly inappropriate” (143) to the personal experiences of a 
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particular person.  They admit that in this case “the same metaphor that gives new 
meaning to our experiences will not give meaning to his” (143).  Lakoff and Johnson’s 
description of an inappropriate metaphor approaches the understanding of metaphor at 
the same intellectual/evaluative level that Burke describes.  Lakoff and Johnson develop 
their ideas to suggest that an inappropriate metaphor may fail “to give new meaning” in 
certain situations, but they do not consider the potential production of antagonistic 
emotion and the effects this will have.  Their own theory suggests, however, that such 
emotional responses are inevitable when accessing remembered experience.  In my 
view, the idea of an inappropriate metaphor deserves further development to consider its 
emotional consequences, which I have undertaken in the model of experienced 
metaphor. 
Rhetorical scholars, beginning with Aristotle, have long recognized that 
metaphor stirs emotion.  The model of experienced metaphor acknowledges the 
emotional aspect of metaphors, but it moves beyond this as well.  This model’s primary 
contribution is to provide a critical analytical tool to evaluate how a particular metaphor 
would be received at an emotional level by a given audience.  While it is impossible to 
know with certainty what exact emotions are evoked by a particular metaphor within an 
individual member of an audience, experienced metaphor does offer the ability to make 
valid propositions about emotional effect within a broad audience.  The rhetorical critic 
can follow a series of evaluations of the images associated with a metaphor.  First, do the 
metaphorical images refer to objects or experiences that are widely familiar within a 
given culture?  If so, would these images be more likely to evoke positive or negative 
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remembered experiences?  Then, what positive or negative emotions, respectively, are 
most typically associated with the experiences most prominent within that culture?  By 
following this process, based on the idea of experienced metaphor, the rhetorical critic is 
able to postulate the most prominent emotional response that a given metaphor will 
produce.  
 This study focuses on the metaphors of natural theology and natural selection, 
which were important to the understanding and reception of Charles Darwin’s theory on 
species change, and also on counter-metaphors produced by Christian critics of Darwin.  
I apply experienced metaphor to natural theology in order to delineate the emotions that 
accompanied Victorian belief in natural theology.  It is my goal to highlight the fact that 
for those who could not integrate natural selection with natural theology, natural 
selection would be seen as an emotional as well as intellectual threat to their faith. 
Western Christian Experience of Natural Theology 
 An understanding of the emotional elements of belief in natural theology helps to 
further explain what was at stake if natural theology were threatened by natural 
selection, as many people took to be the case.  In order to understand the emotional 
response to natural theology for the Victorian Christian audience, I more closely 
examine the language used to describe natural theology. 
As noted previously, in The Advancement of Learning Francis Bacon had called 
nature a book that displayed God’s works.  Though Bacon wrote centuries prior to the 
Victorian period, his work was fundamental to the thought processes of the English-
speaking world, and his image of nature as a book would have been well known.  The 
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use of this idea by Bacon continued a discussion that had begun with Augustine and was 
central to medieval Christian theology.  The analysis of the work of Philip Gosse, which 
appears later in this study, shows that Gosse also used this image of nature as a book, 
calling the earth a “stone book” (371) that reveals the mind of God.  Similarly, Charles 
Lyell used the metaphor of the earth as a book in his Principles of Geology.  After 
showing that ancient Greek philosophers neglected to investigate matters of geology, he 
concludes that “the ancient history of the globe was to them a sealed book, and although 
written in characters of the most striking and imposing kind, they were unconscious 
even of its existence” (27).  The repetitions by Gosse and Lyell of the idea that nature is 
a book demonstrate that a long line of thinkers since Augustine had used this image in 
the description of nature.  By the nineteenth century, the image already had a long 
history within the English-speaking world. 
 Paley, who reaffirmed the concept of natural theology to his Victorian audience, 
created an additional metaphor for nature.  Like Newton, Paley insisted that nature was 
as mechanistic and purposeful as a watch.  In his Natural Theology, Paley portrays the 
discovery and examination of a watch, which vividly sets the image before his audience.  
Paley uses the watch to provide an understanding of nature, for examination of either 
one will result in similar teleological conclusions. Given the prominence of Paley’s 
Natural Theology in the Victorian culture, the image of a watch associated with nature 
would also have been widely familiar.     
 The images of a book and a watch are similar in an important way: they present 
nature as a possession.  Books can be owned and collected.  If rare, they can be quite 
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valuable.  Books also serve as a source of knowledge, which is associated with power, 
prestige, and social status.  Watches, likewise, are items of value, often associated with 
high craftsmanship and passed down through the generations as heirlooms.  The model 
of experienced metaphor suggests that Victorian interpreters of these metaphors would 
access experiences of possessing valuable items, such as a book and a watch.  These 
remembered experiences inevitably evoke emotions consistent with security, status, and 
prosperity.  The metaphorical language attached to nature in the English-speaking world 
meant that natural theology provided Victorian Christians with a positive emotional 
experience. 
As will be seen in the next section, Darwin’s introduction of natural selection 
was viewed by many as a threat to natural theology.  Natural selection, with its 
metaphorical image interpreted by many to sugggest a rival chooser or controller of 
nature, absent any need for God, would be deemed by many Christians to be a threat to 
the security and comfort inherent in the experience of natural theology.  This would have 
profound effects on the way in which many Christians received Darwin’s theory and on 
their rhetorical responses.  Next, I consider the way in which Darwin’s own use of 
metaphor interacted with the metaphor of natural theology. 
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III. DARWIN’S RIVAL VIEW OF NATURE: NATURAL SELECTION, 
EVOLUTION, AND MATERIALISM 
Darwin’s Metaphor of Natural Selection 
 Darwin famously described his ideas on species change using the metaphor of 
natural selection, which was based on a domestic breeder of animals.  In the Preface to 
the Origin Darwin notes that “a careful study of domesticated animals and of cultivated 
plants” (23) served as the original impetus for his consideration of species variation.  His 
first chapter goes into significant detail on the observable variation that occurs from the 
work of breeders and horticulturists.  This is not a work of animal husbandry, however, 
and Darwin gives such detail to this subject only because the work of the domestic 
breeder is an important conceptual foundation for Darwin’s explanation of species 
change.  By analogical comparison, Darwin realized that his concept of species change 
was like the work of the animal breeder.  Because the image of the breeder prompted 
Darwin’s own thoughts on the subject, he then carries it forward for his explanation.  As 
he moves into his own theory in the Origin, Darwin asks, “Can the principle of selection, 
which we have seen is so potent in the hands of man, apply under nature?  I think we 
shall see that it can act most efficiently” (93).  What we can observe a breeder to do in 
selecting traits, Darwin proposes also occurs in nature because of struggle for survival.  
“The preservation of favourable individual differences and variations, and the 
destruction of those which are injurious, I have called Natural Selection. . . ” (94).  In his 
concept of natural selection, Darwin develops his analogical thinking into a metaphor in 
which nature is a selecting entity.  His concept is like an animal breeder who selects 
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certain traits, so he explains his idea as a process in which a purely naturalistic 
mechanism is also described as a selecting entity.   
In explaining his concept of species change, Darwin faced two challenges.  First, 
Darwin did not actually know the biological mechanism at the level of the organism by 
which his theorized process might take place.  How did traits appear in any given 
organism, how could new ones arise, and in what manner were they passed to offspring?  
Darwin developed his theory significantly before the molecular biology of genetics was 
formulated, which would later answer many of these questions.  As John Angus 
Campbell notes, “No more than Plato did Darwin have positive knowledge about the 
actual origin of the species.  What he did have was a sense of what seemed to him (after 
years of study) likely” (“Why” 225).  Darwin’s lack of concrete knowledge meant that 
he had to describe an idea that was far from complete.  The second challenge Darwin 
faced in explaining his theory was the novel nature of his ideas.  Discussion in the 
scientific community about gradual change of species was prominent well before Darwin 
began to formulate the theories eventually published in On the Origin of Species, but 
Darwin’s contribution to the discussion came in a novel concept of how competition 
among living organisms could account for species change.  Though novelty was one of 
the aspects that made Darwin’s theory so important, it also meant that he was 
communicating an idea that had no previous point of reference for his general Victorian 
audience.  Darwin needed to present his ideas in a way that was easily understandable 
even when many of his non-scientific readers had never heard of his concepts before.  
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Without a familiar concept with which readers could compare Darwin’s theory, 
however, it was a difficult idea to explain.   
Campbell suggests that Darwin used metaphor to meet these two challenges.  
Metaphor enabled Darwin to “[contend] with common sense for a cultural space in 
which his new idea could intelligibly appear” (“Why” 206).  No one could see the 
process that Darwin attempted to describe, thus Darwin could offer no proof in terms of 
the empirical demands of science; but something very like the process could be observed 
among breeders, and the metaphorical expansion of this process would give his theory 
both credence and clarity.  Darwin understood that within science, “a truly striking 
analogy could gain common acceptance as a true explanation even if the underlying 
phenomena could not themselves be directly observed” (Campbell “Revolution” 358).  
Metaphor was the means by which Darwin displayed a process that could not be seen.          
Darwin’s use of the metaphor of natural selection met the two major challenges 
he faced in communicating his ideas, but it also caused problems for many interpreters 
of Darwin’s work.  Strictly speaking, Darwin’s theory proposes that certain traits 
continue to exist, while others cease to exist when the reproductively inferior animals 
with those traits die off.  Nothing is selected, for it is a naturalistic process in which there 
is no entity that actually selects or chooses traits.  The metaphor natural selection proved 
problematic to many who focused on a too-literal understanding of it.  The idea of 
selection, many argued, implied a chooser and thus negated the naturalistic quality of 
Darwin’s process.  A. R. Wallace, the co-author of Darwin’s original publication, 
opposed the use of the term because of this type of popular misconception.  He urged 
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Darwin to drop natural selection in favor of something that did not imply “the constant 
watching of an intelligent ‘chooser’”: 
To the few, [natural selection] is as clear as daylight, and beautifully 
suggestive, but to many it is evidently a stumbling block.  I wish 
therefore to suggest to you the possibility of entirely avoiding this source 
of misconception in your great work . . . by adopting Spencer’s term . . . 
“Survival of the fittest”.  
[Survival of the fittest] is the plain expression of the facts—Nat. 
selection is a metaphorical expression of it—and to a certain degree 
indirect and incorrect, since, even personifying Nature, she does not so 
much select special variations, as exterminate the most unfavourable 
[sic] ones. (Wallace, n.p., emphasis original) 
 
In reply to Wallace, Darwin explained that he used the term natural selection because of 
the “great advantage” to understanding that came from “connect[ing] natural and 
artificial selection” (Darwin, Letter 5145 n.p.).  To Darwin, the potential help of the term 
outweighed any misunderstanding of it, and he quipped to Wallace that the term natural 
selection “must depend ‘on the survival of the fittest’. As in time the term must grow 
intelligible, the objections to its use will grow weaker and weaker” (Darwin, Letter 5145 
n.p.).  Darwin argued that the term would either prove useful to understanding and 
survive or continue to confuse and be discarded; it was not an all-encompassing 
description for Darwin, but he did argue for its helpfulness.  Other terms, such as 
survival of the fittest, could be substituted, which would constitute different perspectives 
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in the Burkean sense.  This was acceptable to Darwin in some ways, but he also insisted 
to Wallace that the perspective of natural selection was both valid and useful. 
 Darwin also addressed objections to metaphorical aspects of natural selection in 
later editions of the Origin.  He acknowledged the problem outright, noting that 
“[s]everal writers have misapprehended or objected to the term natural selection” 
because of various problems with the idea of something actively selecting traits.  “In the 
literal sense of the word, no doubt, natural selection is a false term . . . [but] every one 
knows what is meant and implied by such metaphorical expressions; and they are almost 
necessary for brevity” (Origin 94).  Darwin’s clarification of natural selection shows 
again that he was aware that the term was not really “true” in the sense of fact, but he 
insists that this metaphorical way of looking at the problem is helpful.  Natural selection 
approximates the process by giving a visual picture to something that cannot be viewed 
and condenses many complicated details into a manageable idea.  Darwin hopes that the 
helpful nature of the metaphor will prevail and that “[w]ith a little familiarity . . . 
superficial objections will be forgotten” (Origin 94).  By the sixth edition of his work, 
Darwin continued to argue that he could drop the term and still retain his theory—they 
are not synonymous—but that he had not found a better image with which to replace it. 
 If we refer back to the metaphor theory of Burke, Darwin’s metaphor was meant 
to function in a way that Burke would later describe as perspective.  The metaphor 
would be expected to be helpful about some aspects of Darwin’s teaching but not about 
others.  If taken as a perspective, natural selection would work as metaphor should 
according to Burke, “for experimental and heuristic purposes” (Burke 504).  The 
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metaphor could be used or discarded in the future depending on how helpful it proved to 
general understanding and to promoting further inquiry.  According to Michael Ruse, the 
heuristic value of Darwin’s metaphor was in fact the most important aspect of it 
(“Metaphor” 606).  The idea of the metaphor of natural selection as a perspective 
promoting understanding and ongoing inquiry was Darwin’s own view of how his 
metaphor should be taken.   
Eventually, Darwin did incorporate Herbert Spencer’s phrase “Survival of the 
Fittest” as an alternate description of natural selection, as Wallace had urged him to.  In 
this way, we can see that Darwin participated in what Burke would much later describe 
as the parliamentary process of metaphorical description.  The acceptance of another 
metaphor reinforces the idea that Darwin knew the metaphor of natural selection was 
incomplete on its own and did not encompass any idea of Truth, and it also shows 
Darwin’s commitment to a metaphorical description of his mechanism of species 
change. 
Metaphorical Views of Evolution 
 In addition to the metaphor of natural selection, which Darwin coined, he also 
made use of the term evolution, which was not a new idea and was already deeply 
invested with metaphorical meaning.  When Darwin used the term evolution in relation 
to his theory, it was already associated with “an unrolling or unfolding” in which “a final 
result . . . is immanent in the original state” (Lewontin n.p.).  The term denoted progress 
and was often used to describe human civilization before it was applied to biology.  
Many biological evolutionists prior to Darwin, including his own grandfather Erasmus 
   33
Darwin, arrived at their speculations about biological species change because they were 
committed social progressionists and linked the two ideas together.  “[Erasmus] Darwin 
drew an explicit analogy between the progress of culture and the progress of biology, the 
one feeding into the other and then back again” (Ruse Evolution 33), so that “notions of 
evolutionary and cultural progress were inextricably tied together” (Ruse Evolution 32).  
 Darwin’s most notable use of the term evolution comes at the end of the Origin, 
in which he concludes his theory by insisting that: 
There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having 
been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and 
that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of 
gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and 
most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved (490). 
 
Historians debate what Darwin’s use of evolved indicates about his own view of 
progress within his mechanism of species change, but there is little doubt that in using 
the term he was at the very least aware of its previous metaphorical connotations.  He 
speaks of a “simple” beginning that becomes “most beautiful and most wonderful”— 
concepts clearly drawing upon the metaphorical association of evolution with progress.  
While Darwin significantly edited his use of the metaphor of natural selection within 
later editions of the Origin, it is notable that he never removed or changed his 
concluding use of evolved, despite its association with progress.   Ruse notes that 
“Charles Darwin was one of the most ardent social progressionists of the nineteenth 
century” (Evolution 76), which indicates that he would have been very familiar with the 
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association between evolution and progressionism.  What is most pertinent to this study 
is not Darwin’s particular stance on social progression but his knowing use of a term that 
already had significant metaphorical meaning. 
 Darwin’s association with metaphorical understandings of evolution as upward 
progress can further be seen in the language of the Origin.  According to William 
Scheick, the Origin contains many elements of an epic, including an element of mystery 
and, more prominently, the heroic figure that battles toward some better future.  “Such 
[heroic] characters are present in the Origin,” argues Scheick, “in the individual 
ancestral plants and animals which struggled for survival and which, through their 
efforts, give meaning to even our own human existence” (275).  Darwin stated that these 
early species that had survived to propagate themselves were “‘ennobled,’” and every 
one of these heroic “form[s] of life contributes to ‘the same gradual process of 
improvement’” (Scheick 278) associated with evolution.  This epic depiction of 
improvement was, in Scheick’s description, a “victory of the spirit” in “the upward 
struggle of life toward perfection” (278).  While Scheick points out that Darwin’s use of 
epic conventions was almost certainly not intentional (272), the presence of epic 
language and imagery further confirms the idea that Darwin’s work in the Origin 
employed the metaphorical ideas of evolution as an upward progression.     
 Darwin’s language expresses the unknown in terms of already understood 
entities.  This is not necessarily unusual within science.  Theodore L. Brown argues in 
Making Truth: Metaphor in Science that “metaphorical reasoning is at the very core of 
what scientists do when they create experiments” and form models to explain them (14).  
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Typically, however, scientific models/metaphors are built around simple, observable 
physical phenomena that are applied to the unobservable processes in which a scientist is 
interested.  Darwin’s particular metaphors, on the other hand, were used in an attempt to 
provide an understanding of a more comprehensive and conceptual idea—nature—than 
is typical for the work of scientists.  John Angus Campbell argues that Darwin’s 
knowing use of metaphors that were associated with natural theology meant that “the 
Origin situated itself as but the latest in an apostolic succession of works in English 
natural theology” (“Revolution” 358).  According to Campbell, Darwin purposely placed 
his work in this position not because he espoused natural theology but because it was 
required by the “grammar” of his culture.  Darwin had a “tendency directly to exploit the 
resources of the tradition for persuasive advantage” (Campbell “Revolution” 358).  
Whether Darwin’s alignment of his work with natural theology was intentional or not, it 
was counter-productive to his greater empirical goals.  Darwin’s interest was not in 
metaphysical or theological debates.  “Although Darwin could hardly get away from the 
religion issue,” Ruse explains, “it was not really the main focus of his concerns.  He was 
a fulltime scientist, and what he wanted to do was produce a theory of evolution that 
would measure up to the exacting standards of the best science in his day” (Evolution 
81).  Darwin’s goal was to elevate evolutionary biology to an equal standing with the 
respected fields of chemistry and physics (Ruse Evolution 81), but it would prove 
difficult for him keep the discussion in the empirical realm due to his uses of metaphor.   
By describing his theory on species change through prominent use of the 
metaphor of natural selection and aligning his ideas with the idea of evolution as 
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progression, Darwin placed his scientific ideas into a highly metaphorical realm.  We 
have seen that prior to the introduction of his work, the metaphors that he accessed had 
also been highly metaphysical—especially in the case of nature.  Darwin’s language 
would thus align his ideas on species change, for many, with metaphysical 
interpretations.   These metaphysical interpretations, prompted by metaphorical 
language, occurred both in his secular and Christian audiences.  We will briefly consider 
the responses of some within Darwin’s secular audience before moving to a deeper 
consideration of Christian responses to Darwin. 
Nature as Materialism: A Secular Response to Darwin 
 For some, Darwin’s description of natural selection relieved mankind of the need 
for God.  Those who would become ardent supporters of evolution, such as Thomas 
Huxley and Herbert Spencer, developed anti-theological views of nature.  These men 
developed materialistic worldviews based on evolution, bolstered by the fact that 
Darwin had finally given transmutation of the species scientific credibility.  It should be 
noted, however, that the views of nature developed by Huxley and Spencer were still 
highly metaphorical.  For Huxley, who “needed a rival ideology, a secular religion, that 
he could use to fight traditional Anglican Christianity” (Ruse Evolution 106), evolution 
allowed nature to become the great “disprover” of God.  There was no design or purpose 
in the world, just slow, natural change accumulated over time without a need for outside 
interference or even speculations about a first cause.  Ruse argues that Darwin 
“grumbled” (Evolution 94) that Huxley was distorting his theory by using it as an 
insistence for rationalism over religion, but Darwin’s own metaphorical description of 
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nature seemed to support Huxley’s conclusions.  In Huxley’s hands, nature became an 
anti-theological apologist.  While Huxley’s conclusions are not inevitable, Darwin’s 
metaphorical language did make them possible. 
Similarly, Herbert Spencer created his own metaphor of nature in his 
championing of evolution.  Spencer interpreted natural selection to reveal nature as an 
“unending struggle and competition” (Ruse Evolution 108) that should be allowed free 
reign for the betterment of mankind.  Viewing nature as a war or competition had 
significant influence for Spencer on the way that societies should be governed, so that 
nature had even further metaphorical meaning as a force leading to social and ethical 
progress.  Darwin’s own use of the evolutionary/progressive line of thinking and 
language has significance for Spencer’s particular interpretation.  Darwin’s use of an 
already metaphorical idea—evolution—allowed Spencer’s further metaphorical 
development that “natural” death and struggle would lead to progress in the social realm 
just at it did in the biological world. 
Campbell notes that there is no scholarly consensus on Darwin’s own view of 
nature: “Exactly how far Darwin wished to press the naturalist theme, with which the 
Origin is laced, is a legitimate and lively subject of disagreement” (“Intelligent Design” 
13).  It is indisputable, however, that others such as Spencer and Huxley seized on the 
naturalistic theme and metaphorical descriptions offered by the Origin and expanded it 
to fit their own metaphysical views of the world.  
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Defending Natural Theology by Rejection of Evolution 
We have seen that for materialists such as Huxley and Spencer, the metaphors 
representing natural selection were in direct competition with those depicting natural 
theology.  Based on their interpretations of the metaphors of natural selection and 
natural theology, these materialists concluded that only of these two ways of viewing 
nature was valid.  According to this view, if the scientific details described by natural 
selection were true, then natural theology was not a legitimate way in which to view 
nature.  Ironically, many religionists—particularly evangelicals—had a similar response.  
If natural selection were true, it would seem to many Christians that a rival chooser was 
in charge of the world—one whose mode of action was through destruction, which did 
not seem consistent with the idea of a loving God.  Based on the descriptions by Bacon 
and Paley, nature had been seen as a valuable possession.  If nature could no longer be 
seen as a valuable possession but was rather a death-filled war, what did this say about 
God?  And what about those whose faith had become so dependent on this seemingly 
threatened natural theology?  As David Livingstone notes, this latter question would 
prove of utmost importance in many Christian objections to Darwin, for “those who 
seemed to have the greatest difficulty [with the theory of natural selection] were those 
whose religion depended on some version of natural theology” (124).     
Next, I will consider the rhetorical strategies of those Christians who attempted 
to defend natural theology.  I give particular attention to the production of counter-
metaphors in the works of three prominent Victorian-era Christians, Philip Gosse, G. K. 
Chesterton, and Charles Spurgeon. 
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IV. COUNTER-METAPHORS OF AWE AND OF DESTRUCTION IN 
CHRISTIAN RESPONSES TO NATURAL SELECTION 
Integration versus Rejection of Natural Selection 
It is important to note that many within Western Christianity were able to 
accommodate Darwin’s new perspective on nature with relative ease.  The Princeton 
president James McCosh was a good example of this, providing “the first public 
endorsement of evolution by an American religious leader” (Gundlach 85).  McCosh 
was not, despite his acceptance of Darwin’s description of transmutation of the species, 
abandoning a traditional understanding of the Christian faith.  He was elected to the 
Presidency at Princeton precisely for his commitment to “the unity of piety and learning 
and the supremacy of religion over natural knowledge” (Gundlach 86).  Even as “the 
first prominent American Protestant religious leader to espouse evolutionism” 
(Gundlach 86), McCosh still retained his Protestant evangelical beliefs.  He argued that 
the key was to accept “‘evolution properly limited and explained’” (Gundlach 86).  
McCosh believed that Darwin’s new perspective on nature simply augmented, not 
eliminated, earlier understandings of “method and mechanism in the divine production 
of the variety of life” (Gundlach 90).  For McCosh, Darwinian evolution might remove 
“some of the mystery of the cosmos, perhaps,” but it also “revealed to humankind the 
beautiful intricacies of natural law—law whose order, beneficence, and evident 
purposefulness glorified its Ordainer” (91).  McCosh could admit both of the 
metaphorical descriptions of nature that came from natural selection and natural 
theology, each perspective clarifying the other.   
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The integration of natural selection and natural theology would prove difficult 
for many of McCosh’s co-religionists.  Those who could not integrate natural theology 
and natural selection responded in various ways.  Some abandoned natural theology 
altogether, often with a complete loss of their faith as well.  Others maintained their 
adherence to natural theology, insisting that nature revealed God’s plan and goodness.  
This latter group often attempted to publicly defend natural theology using one of two 
strategies: reinforce natural theology or attack natural selection/evolution.  Many such 
critics of Darwin produced counter-metaphors in their defenses of natural theology, such 
as the metaphors of awe/wonder and fear/destruction produced by Philip Gosse, G. K. 
Chesterton, and Charles Spurgeon. 
Metaphors of Awe and Wonder: Philip Gosse and G. K. Chesterton 
The Rhetoric of Gosse’s “Omphalos” 
 Philip Gosse was a prominent Victorian marine naturalist.  As relayed by 
Bernard Lightman in Victorian Popularizers of Science, Gosse is recognized as “the first 
systematic popularizer of general natural history” (169).  His work on marine specimens 
led to the creation of the aquarium, which “almost overnight . . . became a national 
craze” in which “the British middle class traveled to the coast to comb the beaches for 
specimens” (Lightman 1).  Gosse’s son Edmund lamented that the elder Gosse was 
actually responsible for the destruction of the marine world he so carefully studied.  “An 
army of ‘collectors’ has passed over [the tidal pools] and ravaged every corner of them,” 
Edmund recounts.  “That my Father, himself so reverent, so conservative, had by the 
popularity of his books acquired the direct responsibility for a calamity that he had never 
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anticipated, became clear enough to him before many years had passed, and cost him 
great chagrin” (E. Gosse 81).  According to this account by his son, Philip Gosse was 
well enough known as a naturalist to cause ecological damage when many of his 
contemporaries attempted to imitate him. 
It was rather incongruent with Gosse’s religious ideology that he attained 
prominence.  Gosse worked out his religious convictions within the Calvinist Brethren, a 
Christian community of relatively extreme exclusion.  “So far as the [various Protestant] 
sects agreed with my Father and my Mother, the sects were walking in the light,” relays 
Edmund Gosse.  “Wherever they differed from them, they had slipped more or less 
definitely into a penumbra of their own making” (6).  Philip Gosse eventually came to 
the point that he “met with only a few extreme Calvinists” like himself as his source of 
primary social interaction (E. Gosse 7).  When he did interact with others, it was often 
with an attitude of separation.  Ann Thwaite relates that on one occasion Gosse refused 
to accept a dinner invitation from a Unitarian on the grounds that Scripture forbade it 
(206), and his son Edmund remembers that the gatherings of a local family of Baptists 
were seen by his father to be absolutely against the will of the Lord (141-2).  In many 
ways, Gosse’s prominence came upon him by historical accident—he happened to be a 
talented naturalist in a culture clambering for scientific knowledge of the natural world.   
Gosse was a strict Biblical literalist, which meant that he would have difficulty 
with many of the scientific theories of his time.  His viewpoint on the literal nature of 
Scripture is seen mainly in the recollections of Edmund in Father and Son.  “[F]or my 
Father,” Edmund explains, “nothing was symbolic, nothing allegorical or allusive in any 
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part of Scripture” (E. Gosse 41).  Gosse’s adherence to a literal interpretation of 
Scripture extended even to apocalyptic passages, and Philip and Edmund held spirited 
discussions on the exact historical manner in which eschatological passages would be 
fulfilled (E. Gosse 44-5.)  Despite the significant attack on Biblical literalism during his 
lifetime, Ann Thwaite relays that Gosse always maintained “‘that this world, with all 
that it contains, was really created 6000 years ago, as the plain Word of God declares’” 
(315).  Gosse made this statement after his own attempt to defend a literal reading of 
Genesis through his apologetic work Omphalos failed.  His commitment to Biblical 
literalism survived even the most ardent scientific onslaughts.  
Like other Biblical literalists, Gosse’s interpretation of Genesis insisted on six 
twenty-four hour days of creation, special creation of each form of animal, and fixity of 
the species.  This literal interpretation of Genesis, which would become increasingly 
prominent within evangelicalism in the late nineteenth and throughout the twentieth 
centuries, was not the prominent way of viewing Genesis early in Christian history.  For 
example, Augustine formulated in his Confessions a lengthy allegorical and spiritual 
interpretation of the Genesis account of creation.  Augustine allows multiple 
interpretations of the creation account, insisting that there may be many “true 
opinion[s]” of what Moses meant when he wrote Genesis (Confessions 271).  Following 
Augustine’s example, figurative interpretations of Genesis were frequent throughout the 
Middle Ages.  A similar approach to the Biblical creation account was common within 
historical Judaism, as well.  A figurative view of the early chapters of Genesis was 
advocated by Moses Maimonides, who was “perhaps the most highly revered and 
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authoritative rabbinical interpreter of the Torah from the 12th century up to the present” 
(Osborn n.p.).    Maimonides viewed “the philosophic sciences as indispensable exegetic 
tools for bringing the inner intent of Scripture to light” (Davidson 335).  Though 
Maimonides wrote long before Darwin, he still concluded that what was known of the 
physical world opposed a literal reading of the Genesis creation account and taught “that 
the biblical story of the creation of the world over a period of six days is not intended 
literally” (Davidson 337).  Despite the figurative approach to Genesis in the history of 
both Christianity and Judaism, figurative readings would be challenged by many, 
especially within Christianity, as the Protestant Reformation led to increasing Biblical 
literalism.  This historical shift toward a literal understanding of Genesis caused 
Darwinian evolution to be problematic to many Christians.  As McGrath notes, 
“Darwinism became most worrisome to Christians in cultures that had been particularly 
influenced by literal readings of the Book of Genesis” (381).  While Gosse’s adherence 
to Biblical literalism came early in this movement, his literal hermeneutic caused him 
difficulty with scientific theories of the Victorian era. 
Gosse objected to the geological conclusions of Lyell rather than the natural 
selection of Darwin, but his focus on geology does not mean that he accepted 
transmutation of the species.  Within Omphalos he takes fixity of the species as a given.  
Gosse published Omphalos prior to Darwin’s publication of the Origin, so at the time of 
his writing transmutation of the species was rejected by most scientists.  
Gosse wrote Omphalos with a goal of nothing less than discrediting geology as a 
means to determine the age of the earth.  Lyell’s Principles of Geology was a significant 
   44
problem for Gosse on two accounts.  First, the old age of the earth, based on the 
geological data presented by Lyell, discredited a literal six-day reading of Creation and 
also genealogies contained within Genesis—both crucial to literal readings of Scripture 
that were central to Gosse’s faith.  Second, as a talented naturalist, Lyell’s work was also 
problematic because Gosse could not deny the geological data that Lyell referred to. 
Gosse accepted the new facts being presented by geologists (P. Gosse 4), so that he 
admitted that “the records which seem legibly written on [God’s] created works do flatly 
contradict the statements which seem to be plainly expressed in His word” (P. Gosse 4).  
Gosse spends considerable time in Omphalos arguing against extant attempts to 
reconcile Scripture with geology, including the Diluvian theories, because they were 
scientifically untenable.  He accepted the reality of the fossil record.  He also refused to 
hide behind Diluvian theories, which he saw had little scientific merit, for how the 
fossils arrived in the earth.  Given the challenges presented by Lyell’s theory, Gosse was 
compelled to find a solution lest he be forced to abandon either his faith or his scientific 
standards.  Eventually Gosse developed a theory that quieted the disturbances of his own 
mind.  In writing Omphalos he offered his solution to other “thousands of thinking 
persons who are scarcely satisfied with the extant reconciliations of Scriptural statements 
and Geological deduction—who are silenced but not convinced” (viii).   In his attack on 
geological deductions, Gosse offers a combination of scientific and philosophical 
arguments against Lyell’s account of the age of the earth.   
What is notable from the standpoint of this study is the metaphorical language 
that Gosse uses.  For Gosse, Lyell threatens natural theology because his theory suggests 
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that nature contradicts Scripture— the “book of God’s words”— and thus makes 
anything present in nature useless for understanding of God.  Gosse is defending the 
view of natural theology in which Scripture takes far greater precedence than “the book 
of God’s works” in nature.  I will give a brief summary of Gosse’s work and then 
evaluate his use of metaphor. 
It is difficult to summarize Omphalos.  As Ann Thwaite describes it, “no 
paraphrase can do it justice” (214).  Gosse gives his own greatly reduced summary as 
follows: “All organic nature moves in a circle.  Creation is a violent irruption into the 
circle of nature” (qtd in Thwaite 214).  Gosse based his theory on the notion that the 
circular life-cycles of both plants and animals, beginning in germinal states, progressing 
through maturation, and then beginning again with reproduction, is a fixed law of nature.  
There is not a single living thing that does not follow this circular life-cycle.  Given the 
necessity of ongoing circularity, Gosse poses the problem of where in the life-cycle the 
history of any given organism can be said to begin.  Gosse proposes that it is “the order 
of all organic nature” that “once we are in any portion of [the life cycle] we find 
ourselves running in a circular groove, as endless as the course of a blind horse in a mill” 
(122).  “It is evident,” concludes Gosse, “that there is no one point in the history of any 
single creature, which is a legitimate beginning of existence” (122).  At the sudden act of 
Creation, which Gosse takes as a given, a single moment of the life-cycle of every living 
thing came into physical existence.  The earlier parts of the life-cycle, however, still 
existed.  Indeed, Gosse argues, they must have existed, for we cannot conceive of a cow, 
for example, that had not previously been an embryo.  If God created a cow in mature 
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form, the embryo still existed, but it existed immaterially, before time began.  Gosse 
calls this a prochronic existence, which is before time and dwells only in the mind of 
God.  Thus, the earth will have an appearance of an antiquity that is not real but that 
reflects the existence of all things in the eternal mind of God.  At creation, God’s mind 
became manifest.  Within his mind, the life-cycles of all living things had been going on 
for eternity past.  Gosse declares that “the Creator had before his mind a projection of 
the whole life-history of the globe” which “lay like a map before his infinite mind” 
(349).The previous parts of the life-cycles of each created thing were given physical 
being, as well, accounting for the apparent age of the earth and the presence of the 
fossils.     
Gosse claims that the physical creation of previous parts of the life-cycle was not 
arbitrary.  He anticipates that some will claim that his theory suggests God formed 
“objects whose sole purpose was to deceive us” (347).  Indeed, Gosse notes that some 
“simple-minded observers” had “been inclined to take refuge from the conclusion of 
geology in the absolute sovereignty of God, asking,--‘Could not the Omnipotent Creator 
make the fossils in the strata, just as they now appear’” (368).  Gosse’s theory of 
prochronism is different in his mind because in it God acts according to natural law, or 
the necessarily circular life-cycle of all organisms.   
Gosse’s theory in Omphalos was complex.  It prompted Charles Kingsley to tell 
Gosse “that in twenty-five years he had read ‘no other book which so staggered and 
puzzled’” him (Thwaite 223).  This was due in part to the fact that Gosse attempted to 
combine abstract philosophical ideas about the nature of God’s mind with detailed 
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scientific data.  As a naturalist, Gosse was widely knowledgeable on the life-cycles of 
both plants and animals. Gosse gives extensive examples of how his theory would be 
observed in a great variety of species.  At the beginning of Omphalos he also details the 
current geological findings and reviews the theories that had attempted to account for 
them within a young earth paradigm.  In these aspects, Omphalos reads very much like a 
scientific paper.  However, Gosse also employs significant amounts of metaphorical 
language in his attempt to persuade about his scientific and philosophical theory.  It is 
within this poetic language that Gosse employs metaphor in order to reaffirm the 
preeminence of natural theology.  
 Gosse believed that the earth was the literal physical manifestation of God’s 
mind.  Consistent with the long history of the tradition of natural theology, he calls the 
earth a “stone book” (371) in which the thoughts of the author-God are recorded via the 
fossils within the geological strata.  Omphalos acts as a kind of tour guide to the day of 
Creation, for which Gosse employs rich language and metaphor in order to convey the 
greatness of being able to observe God’s mind through the wonders of plant and animal 
life.  Gosse’s use of poetic language, particularly metaphor, imbues his work with an 
unmistakable sense of wonder.  I will consider a number of these passages. 
 Gosse organizes his argument by giving descriptions of organisms that progress 
from least to most complex.  As Gosse moves his treatise from the observation of plant 
to animal life, he exclaims: 
Let us look for animals.  We retrace our steps to the verge of the rippling 
sea, where the belt of umbrageous Mangroves fringes its margin.  
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Beneath the arching roots of these are now reposing in the warm sunlit 
shallows many creatures which number this as the first day of their 
existence. (182) 
In this passage Gosse is beginning the discussion of invertebrate sea creatures, but he 
presents an image of peaceful sunbathers enjoying the “sunlit shallows” of the “rippling 
sea.”  This language insists that nature is an orderly place of repose for the creatures that 
manifest God’s eternal mind.  Later, returning his tour to an organism in the ocean, he 
anthropomorphizes the sea:   
Hark to that hollow roar!  There is no mistaking that majestic sound.  It is the 
voice of the many-sounding sea.  Yonder through the trees we catch a 
glimpse of its shining face, and here we are at the verge of the cliffs, against 
whose feet the waves are breaking in white foam. (215) 
The sea is given “majestic voice” and a “shining face,” evoking beauty of both sound 
and figure.  This metaphor anthropomorphizes an aspect of nature, as does natural 
selection, but Gosse’s description does not give nature deified power.  The sea is merely 
given a voice.  Given Gosse’s argument that the earth reveals God’s mind, the voice of 
the sea enables it to become an agent of worship.   
Gosse’s poetic language is also used in reference to the many animals that he 
considers.  In one passage he attributes the features of a warrior to the crocodile: 
Here crouches, among the thick reeds, the Leviathan of the rivers, the 
mailed Crocodile.  His body, invested with bony ridged plates, that rise 
into strong serrations along the tail, seems clothed with power; and his 
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long rows of interlocking teeth, unveiled by lips, appear grinning with 
perpetual rage. (248) 
Similar to the image of the crocodile as a soldier, to the ibex Gosse attributes the 
form of a protective king, standing as “a watchful sentinel” over his herd, 
wearing a crown of “noble horns, which are at once his defense and his pride” 
(257).  The metaphors of soldier and king associated with the crocodile and ibex 
do grant these creatures an image of power, but it is a protective power.  Once 
again, similar to the sea, despite being anthropomorphized these aspects of 
nature do not compete with God but rather do his work.  Kings and soldiers 
represent and defend their people.  Based on my application of Lakoff and 
Johnson in experienced metaphor, I posited that that the images of natural 
theology—a book and a watch—suggest the possession of a valuable object. 
Gosse’s images of king and soldier work to offer security for those possessions.  
In these examples of metaphor, which are not exhaustive, Gosse uses poetic style 
and metaphor to convey a sense of wonder at the creatures he describes.  A 
crocodile, “grinning in perpetual rage,” must not be taken for granted, for he is 
nothing less than the physical form of God’s mind. 
 Gosse also employs literary elements that place his reader within a virtual 
drama in Omphalos.  He directly addresses the reader, asking him “to 
accompany me in an ideal tour of inspection among the creatures, taking up each 
for examination” (128).  Another character then joins the drama.  Gosse calls on 
a botanist to accompany himself and the reader (128), and the imagined botanist 
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even enters into dialogue with his companions.  At one point, the figure of the 
botanist produces a circular saw, “which I always carry about with me for 
investigations” (179), which he uses to examine the inside of a tree trunk.  Later, 
as Gosse considers the shark, standing on the “promontory” from which “we can 
look far down into the clear profundity of the still and smooth sea” (240), he 
insists that the reader not merely observe but also consider a potential interaction 
with the shark.  “Let us go down and look in his mouth. . . . Is not this an awful 
array of knives and lancets?  Is not this the case of surgical instruments enough 
to make you shudder?  What would be the amputation of your leg to this row of 
triangular scalpels” (243)?  By the use of second person, the inclusion of other 
characters, and the vivid description of the scenery, Gosse creates a sense of an 
unfolding drama in which the reader participates.   
Gosse’s treatment of time and use of metaphor provide his defense of 
natural theology.  He invites the audience to experience, in the present 
moment—not a remembered past or imagined future—the wonder inherent in 
nature.  His language invests nature with images of beauty, worship, and 
protective power.  As already noted, Gosse’s conclusion in Omphalos is that the 
earth is a stone book that reveals the mind of God.  His overt use of the metaphor 
of a book, as well as his own metaphors of awe and wonder encourage a similar 
positive emotional experience of nature, which I have previously shown to be 
inherent in the experience of natural theology.  Gosse’s appeal to emotion 
through metaphor thus reinforces and defends natural theology.      
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Wonder in Chesterton’s “Ethics of Elfland” 
 Like Gosse, G. K. Chesterton created metaphors of wonder in Orthodoxy.  
Chesterton is often characterized by the diversity of roles that he filled as a writer.  He 
wrote everything from foreign war correspondence to mystery novels.  For the purposes 
of this study, Chesterton is pertinent in his role as a Christian apologist.  Chesterton’s 
form of apologetics was unusual, not built on the kind of logical evidentiary arguments 
typically thought of as apologetics.  Though he engaged in public debate and wrote a 
great deal of work in which he defends his traditional Christian views, he did so using a 
strategy of wit and paradox.  Chesterton “perceived paradoxes in reality and described 
them using paradoxical language and analogies,” which was also “true of his 
apologetical style” (Perrin 198).  He actually found traditional apologetics of little help 
and went “so far as to say that he strove to avoid even reading Christian apologetics” 
(Perrin 198).  Despite his avowed distaste for apologetics and his unusual style, he 
constantly attempted in his many works to give defense for the Christian faith and 
explain his own views on life.   
One of the more clearly apologetic of his works is Orthodoxy, in which he 
proposes to show that Christianity is the only way in which one is able to make sense of 
the realities of the world.  It is in this book that Chesterton defends natural theology 
against a competing metaphorical view of nature.  Chesterton, an eventual convert to 
Roman Catholicism, was not a Biblical literalist and had no problem with the empirical 
theory of natural selection.  What he did object to, however, was Spencer’s brand of 
what can be termed “Scientism.”  Scientism is the “label for an intellectual imperialism 
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that makes ever greater demands in the name of science” (Jaki 29) in a way that is “to 
[sic] far beyond its purely quantitative relevance” (Jaki 30).  This kind of popular 
science, as promoted by men such as Spencer and Haeckel, led to “blind determinism, 
intellectual imperialism if not plain tyranny, and . . . stifling hopelessness” (Keats 331).  
It was the view of nature as a purely mechanistic struggle for survival that Chesterton 
attacked.  In doing so, similar to Gosse, he employed metaphors that reinforced the idea 
of nature as a valuable possession that was so integral to natural theology.  Chesterton 
argues for natural theology in the chapter in Orthodoxy entitled “Ethics of Elfland.” 
“Ethics of Elfland” describes Chesterton’s sense of wonder at the world.  For 
Chesterton, this wonder is similar to the wonder present in the fairy tales of his 
childhood, in which anything may be possible.  While scientific laws are given to 
explain the necessity of physical actions, such as the law of gravity insisting that an 
apple will fall to the ground, Chesterton claims that “there are no laws, but only weird 
repetitions” (48).  He does not accept the fact that because a physical act has always 
been observed, it follows that it must occur.  Science has formed a kind of “scientific 
fatalism” in which it insists “that everything is as it must always have been, being 
unfolded without fault from the beginning” (Chesterton 56).  Chesterton says that this 
scientific fatalism describes something that is dead; he counters that the world is not 
dead and predictable, but alive with possibilities.  The leaf on the tree should be 
appreciated for its green-ness by virtue of the fact that it might have been something 
else, but is not (Chesterton 56).  The repetitions of the universe need not be seen as the 
result of inevitable laws, for it could equally be that God simply repeats the same actions 
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in the world over and over again, unvarying, because he likes it.  Chesterton muses that 
it “may not be automatic necessity that makes all daisies alike; it may be that God makes 
every daisy separately, but has never got tired of making them” (58).  Chesterton sees 
the world as wild and beautiful, and he describes it with words and phrases such as 
“magic” (62) and “fairy tale” (48).  Chesterton is “frightfully fond of the universe” (61) 
because it is “beautiful in its old design” (63). 
 Chesterton ultimately condenses his wonder at life in the image of a jewel.  “I 
felt and feel that life itself is as bright as the diamond,” he muses (54).  Later, he 
consolidates this thought further into his primary metaphor: “For the universe is a single 
jewel, and while it is natural cant to talk of a jewel as peerless and priceless, of this jewel 
it is literally true.  This cosmos is indeed without peer and without price: for there cannot 
be another” (63).  Chesterton’s idea that the universe is a priceless jewel clearly 
reiterates the commonly held image within natural theology of nature as a valuable 
possession.  Developing the idea of the value of the universe as a possession, Chesterton 
clarifies that it is “priceless” (63), indicating that it is not simply something to own but 
also to be enjoyed and cared for.  Once again we see in Chesterton the production of a 
metaphor that reinforces the positive experience of the metaphor of natural theology.  
Given the choice presented by Chesterton—nature as a dead machine or as a priceless 
jewel—the latter metaphor appeals to security and status and argues for the superiority 
of natural theology.   
 The works by Gosse and Chesterton considered here reveal the use of metaphors 
of awe and wonder to defend the metaphorical view of nature most often associated with 
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natural theology: that nature reveals God’s ongoing personal work among humankind 
and proves his goodness.  An alternate approach to the defense of natural theology 
consists of attack upon the ideas associated with Darwinian evolution.  I will next 
consider a sermon by Charles Spurgeon in which he clearly employs a rhetoric of fear in 
an attempt to combat evolution, creating counter-metaphors of evolution as a source of 
sin and as a doorway to destruction. 
The Rhetoric of Fear: Spurgeon’s “Hideous Discovery” 
Spurgeon became one of the most recognized and popular preachers in London, 
preaching for over thirty years to “over five thousand people in both the morning and 
evening services” at his church on a Sunday (Ellison 86).  Beyond the faithful attendees 
of the Metropolitan Tabernacle where he was pastor, he also held something of celebrity 
status for travelers to London.  Robert Ellison relays that Spurgeon actually became “one 
of the foremost tourist attractions in London” (86).  For those who could not hear 
Spurgeon in person, his sermons were also printed and published widely in both Great 
Britain and the United States; in these combined markets millions of copies of his 
sermons were sold (Ellison 87).  The sermons were also translated into many languages.  
One contemporary reviewer of Spurgeon’s work believed “that they will ultimately be 
accepted as incomparably the greatest contribution to the literature of experimental 
Christianity that has been made in this century” (qtd in Ellison 88).  There is no question 
that Spurgeon’s eloquence on theological matters made him one of the more widely 
known figures of the Victorian Era. 
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Spurgeon was, like Gosse, a strict Biblical literalist, insisting on a literal reading 
of the Genesis creation account of six twenty-four hour days, the historical death and 
resurrection of Christ for salvation, and the historical fulfillment of the events of 
Revelation, among other accounts.  Spurgeon’s commitment to Biblical literalism can be 
seen in his response to the threat to Scripture that was coming from the onslaught of 
Higher Criticism.  He was the center of a controversy within his own Baptist 
denomination, called the “Down-Grade Controversy” (E. Bacon 128), in which 
Spurgeon insisted that some Baptist ministers required censure for liberalism in their 
theology.  Spurgeon published a magazine, The Sword and Trowel, which printed an 
article during the controversy outlining the “ways in which unsound doctrine and heresy 
can obtain a foothold in the churches” (E. Bacon 130).  High among these concerns for 
Spurgeon was loss of belief in the literal truth of Scripture.  The article “dealt mainly 
with the inspiration and authority of the Scriptures, with nearly half of the confession 
given to that subject” (Swanson, n.p.).  Spurgeon was so committed to his stance for 
Biblical literalism against that of others in his denomination that he chose to withdraw 
from the Baptist Union rather than be aligned with those who did not share his view of 
Scripture (E. Bacon 134).  Like Gosse, Spurgeon’s literal hermeneutics would place him 
at odds with scientific theories that questioned his interpretation of Genesis.  Unlike 
Gosse, Spurgeon continued public comment on such issues well after Darwin published 
the Origin, so he dealt more specifically with natural selection.  
     Spurgeon commented widely on issues surrounding Darwinian evolution in his 
sermons and letters, so it is difficult to reduce his views to any one work.  The 1886 
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sermon “Hideous Discovery” is a good representative of his language and views.  Within 
this sermon Spurgeon is pointed on the evils of Darwinian evolution.  Delivered almost 
thirty years after the publication of the Origin, it offers a well-developed viewpoint—not 
only of his views but those of his followers, as well.  In this sermon Spurgeon speaks on 
a short New Testament passage that records words of Jesus.   
 In the biblical passage on which “Hideous Discovery” is based, Mark 7:20-23, 
Jesus gives a list of sins that originate within a person.  In the American King James 
Version, used by Spurgeon in this sermon, the text reads: 
And He said, That which comes out of the man, that defiles the man.  For 
from within, out of the heart of men, proceed evil thoughts, adulteries, 
fornications, murders, thefts, covetousness, wickedness, deceit, 
lasciviousness, an evil eye, blasphemy, pride, foolishness: all these 
things come from within and defile the man. (qtd. in Spurgeon 1) 
Jesus’ main point in this passage seems to be that sin is more than merely external action 
but actually derives from within a person.  Spurgeon takes the list of sins as progressive, 
“for it begins with thoughts and then it runs on until it lands in utter lack of thought, or 
foolishness” (2).  According to Spurgeon, evil thoughts, as the first of the progression, 
are not to be “lightly regarded” (2) because they result in the inevitable onslaught of the 
other sins.   
 Given the destructive nature of evil thoughts in his progressive reading of the 
passage, it is surprising that at first Spurgeon actually does not give any specific 
examples of evil thoughts.  He is content to summarize “evil and vain thoughts” as those 
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“which quibble at the revealed Truth of God and would improve upon the Infallible 
declaration of Jehovah” (2).  In this commentary we can see Spurgeon’s commitment to 
Scripture as the authoritative source for all True thought.  Any thought that questions 
Scripture, as it eventually came to be canonized well after the passage in Mark from 
which he preaches, is not merely wrong but evil.  Early in the sermon, Spurgeon 
declares that people “are diseased to the heart with sin and ready to die and pass before 
the Judgment Seat to receive . . . condemnation” (1).  This teaching is consistent with the 
evangelical conviction that each person must find salvation from his or her sins in the 
atonement of Jesus.  Otherwise, as Spurgeon notes, sins lead to judgment and 
destruction.  Sin, as noted in the text of Mark, proceeds from evil thoughts.   
 Strictly speaking, the Scripture passage of the sermon has no relation to 
Darwinian theory on evolution.  It does not relate to Biblical teaching on origins or age 
of the earth.  Nevertheless Spurgeon discusses evolution about halfway into his sermon, 
which I quote at length: 
Another fine theory of modern times is disproved in our text.  According 
to this evolution doctrine, as applied to theology, the new birth is a 
development of that which is in the heart.  I hope we may be spared such 
births and evolutions!  According to this theory we have had some fine 
specimens of regenerate people of late, for we have heard of evolutions 
of developments which have brought out from within evil thoughts, 
adulteries, fornications and wickednesses of more than average 
proportions!  God save us from all the development of the sin which 
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dwells in man!  Philosophically the dogma of evolution is a dream, a 
theory without a vestige of proof!  Within 50 years, children in school 
will read of extraordinary popular delusions and this will be mentioned 
as one of the most absurd of them!  Many a merry jest will be uttered 
bearing upon the follies of science in the 19th Century.  In its bearing 
upon religion, this vain notion is however, no theme for mirth, for it is 
not only deceptive, but it threatens to be mischievous in a high degree.  
There is not a hair of truth on this dog from its head to its tail, but it 
rends and tears the simple ones.  In all its bearings upon Scriptural Truth, 
the evolution theory is in direct opposition to it!  If God’s Word is true, 
evolution is a lie!  I will not mince the matter—this is not the time for 
soft speaking. (5) 
 
Spurgeon introduces the above passage in response to the hypothetical suggestion that 
“the life may be impure and yet the heart is good” (5).  According to Spurgeon’s 
depiction here, evolution teaches that each human progresses toward greater moral 
perfection in “a development of that which is naturally within the heart” (5).  The 
introduction of evolution at this point in his sermon is rather abrupt.  It reads as an aside, 
akin to, “And by the way, this passage shows us that people don’t go from worse to 
better, but from sin to worse sin.  There is no such thing as the world getting slowly 
better!”  In reality, Spurgeon’s characterization of evolution here has nothing to do with 
Darwin’s empirical theory on species variation through natural selection but rather refers 
to the application of the idea of progression, or evolution with improvement, to the 
   59
realm of morality.  Darwin’s association with progressionism had been used by many as 
ongoing support for the idea of progressive moral and cultural evolution.  Though this 
idea of moral progression had been prominent before Darwin, particularly in eighteenth 
century historical accounts of civilization as well as in Calvinist providentialism, 
Spurgeon indicates that the idea of moral progression was applied in an additional way 
after Darwin.  According to Spurgeon’s comments, some interpreters of Darwin claimed 
that moral progression occurred within individuals over the course of their lifetime, 
which mirrored the process that occurred in the biological species over the ages.  
Spurgeon notes that his passage contradicts the idea of moral progression within a 
particular human being.  Spurgeon’s aside, in which he refers to “this evolution 
doctrine” (5), then moves on to the legitimate challenge that Darwin’s theory poses to 
Spurgeon’s form of Biblical interpretation.  After derisively characterizing evolution as 
an “extraordinary popular delusion” which will result in “many a merry jest,” Spurgeon 
checks his jovial treatment of the matter.  The subject is “no theme for mirth” because 
evolution contradicts God’s word, is “deceptive,” and “threatens to be mischievous in a 
high degree” (5).   
Spurgeon’s reasoning within this sermon creates a metaphorical description of 
his concept of evolution.  Early in his sermon he develops the idea that evil thoughts are 
the root of all sin and that sin leads to destruction.  His progressive reading of the sins 
listed in the biblical text suggests the image of a pathway, with each sin leading forward 
to the next.  At the beginning of this pathway stands “evil thoughts,” which begins the 
progression along the path of evil.  This teaching may be described by the metaphor evil 
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thoughts are a doorway to destruction.  Spurgeon does not explicitly state this metaphor, 
but it encompasses his teaching.  Later in his text, Spurgeon equates evil thoughts, the 
root of all sin, with any thought contrary to Scripture.   “Thinking contrary to God’s 
mind and disputing with the clear statements of God’s own Word may be the first step in 
a descent which shall end in everlasting destruction” (3).  Further development of 
Spurgeon’s argument expands the metaphor evil thoughts are a doorway to destruction 
to become thoughts contrary to God’s word are a doorway to destruction.  Once 
Spurgeon defines evolution as contrary to the word of God, his teaching on the topic 
becomes evolution is a doorway to destruction.  While the concept of evolution was 
hailed by others as positive through both the metaphor of progress and Darwin’s own 
epic presentation of it, Spurgeon attempts to counter this by equating evolution with 
destruction.  He argues that the progression is downward, toward destruction, rather than 
toward greater good and development.  Spurgeon accesses a long metaphorical history 
associated with a term, but attempts to create a counter-metaphor that warns his 
audience away from acceptance of the theory.  
 Spurgeon’s aim in “Hideous Discovery,” the rejection of evil thoughts contrary 
to Scripture—most prominently evolution—is based on an appeal to fear, which is 
apparent in his own use of metaphorical language.  We have already seen how he checks 
himself when he allows humor to come into his sermon, yet he not only ceases his 
“mirth” but also immediately creates an image of danger.  Evolution is depicted as a 
“dog” upon which “there is not a hair of truth . . . from its head to its tail” (5).  Lest the 
image should fail in its effect, Spurgeon warns that this dog is vicious, for “it rends and 
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tears the simple ones” (5).  Spurgeon pictures evolution as a vicious dog attacking a 
child, tearing her to pieces.  Elsewhere in the sermon Spurgeon applies similar images of 
fear or destruction to “evil thoughts,” of which evolution is the only specifically named 
example.  Evil thoughts are seen as “unclean birds that find a cage within the human 
heart” (8), which evokes the image of carrion trapped in the human soul.  Sin, “rising in 
evil thought,” flows “through a black country full of varying immoralities until it falls 
into the Dead Sea of ‘foolishness’” (3).  This image presents a wasteland and stagnation.  
Similarly, evil thoughts are “rivers of pollution” (4) and “poisons in the air deadly to all 
who breathe them” (4).  By connecting evil thoughts, most prominently evolution, to 
pictures of destruction, death, and decay, Spurgeon creates images of fear which are 
obviously to be avoided.  In his conclusion, listeners are urged to “accept the old and 
tried everlasting Gospel,” which requires that “no new theories” be admitted (8), a 
doctrine consistent with later evangelical ideas on the interpretation of Scripture.  By his 
use of metaphor Spurgeon sets up a strict dichotomy: acceptance of “the clear statements 
of God’s own Word” (3) or acceptance of evil thoughts, associated with death and 
destruction.  When evolution is specifically names as an evil thought, the resultant 
destruction is particularly violent—to be torn to pieces by a beast. 
 Spurgeon’s rhetoric in “Hideous Discovery” is similar to the previously 
considered approaches of Gosse and Chesterton in that he uses metaphor to make his 
appeal for natural theology and against evolution.  However, Spurgeon produces a fear-
based counter-metaphor of “evolution as destruction,” which directly opposes the 
prominent metaphor of “evolution as progress” that was circulating widely in Victorian 
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culture.  To return to my idea of experienced metaphor, the result of Spurgeon’s images 
of death and destruction will be something more than just mental contemplation.  His 
images evoke fear as the appropriate response to the idea of evolution and will make a 
dispassionate Burkean combination of this “viewpoint” with Spencer’s and Darwin’s 
difficult.      
Spurgeon’s language in “Hideous Discovery” also casts acceptance or rejection 
of evolution as a once-for-all choice.  In reality, an opinion is not a one-time event—a 
person’s opinion on the merits of Darwin’s theory of evolution can change over time.  
However, Spurgeon’s metaphors promote the idea that rejection of evolution needs to 
occur in the present moment and must be irrevocable.  His language discourages his 
audience from even contemplating the new theory.  Most prominently, entering the 
“doorway” of evolution results in inevitable destruction.  For the Christian who wants to 
avoid destruction, evolution is to be labeled as an evil thought and forever sealed away 
from further consideration.   
In depicting the acceptance or rejection of evolution as a one-for-all choice, 
Spurgeon’s metaphors make use of the rhetorical strategy that Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca describe as the locus of the irreparable.  J. Robert Cox notes that the “object or 
act which qualifies as irreparable is necessarily unique” and “cannot be restored” (229).  
Additionally, the irreparable is characterized by precariousness (Cox 230).  Spurgeon 
speaks of the unique fate of the eternal soul, hanging precariously in the balance 
between eternal destruction and salvation.  While the locus of the irreparable usually 
results in heightened information seeking before a decision is made (Cox 234), 
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Spurgeon’s metaphors, particularly that of a vicious dog, appeal to fear in his audience 
and stress urgency in the decision regarding evolution.  Cox argues that “images of 
death, denial, separation, or loss” result in a heightened sense of the timeliness of a 
choice or action (231).  Spurgeon’s images confirm that images of death urge timely 
action.  A vicious beast today will still be a vicious beast tomorrow and can only be 
avoided if kept behind a strong barrier.  Avoidance provides the only assurance of safety 
and, ultimately, salvation.            
As Perelman notes, “the effect of argument which makes use of [the locus of the 
irreparable] can be overwhelming” (91).  Spurgeon’s use of the locus of the irreparable, 
which promotes absolute and final rejection of evolution, would have profound effects 
on the way that the discourse on evolution would be approached by his audience.   
The Fate of Darwin’s Theory 
 Though it is often assumed that Darwin’s theory of natural selection was met 
with full acceptance in the scientific world, in reality the empirical facts described by 
natural selection were not well accepted by biologists after his publication of the Origin.  
Without the mechanisms that would later be discovered through the study of genetics, 
most scientists in the nineteenth century did not accept that natural selection was capable 
of doing all that Darwin claimed it could.  Darwin was widely hailed as giving 
credibility to transmutation of the species and as elevating the idea to a matter for 
serious empirical study, but natural selection was by no means the new paradigm.  
“Objections logically fatal to the theory were voiced by scientists” within less than a 
decade of the Origin’s publication (Campbell “Ancestry” 2), and most scientists felt that 
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natural selection had been disproved.  Even Thomas Huxley, the famous champion of 
Darwin and evolution, did not accept or teach natural selection (Ruse Evolution 94).  
While most scientists in the twentieth century would eventually conclude that Darwin 
had been right in his theory of natural selection, the only thing that Darwin convinced 
most of his contemporaries of was that the idea of transmutation was probable.  
Campbell argues that while Darwin was indeed successful, it “was very much a victory 
over the imagination,” not the empirical (“Ancestry” 2).  The relative scientific failure of 
natural selection means that in the decades after Darwin, “evolution” and did not refer to 
an accepted empirical theory.   
 Prior to Darwin, nature had been seen as the revealer of God’s order and 
goodness, and evolution had been seen as an unfolding progress.  Darwin’s theory of 
natural selection became another metaphorical, and for many a metaphysical, 
understanding of nature.  Some took natural selection to prove nature was an anti-
theological apologist or violent struggle.  Others, such as Gosse, Chesterton, and 
Spurgeon, produced further counter-metaphors in order to urge their audiences to 
maintain the view of nature consistent with natural theology.  This study shows that 
metaphor has long dominated the discourse surrounding Darwin.   
This dominance by metaphor has not been well-recognized outside of academia, 
and often goes unrecognized in many academic disciplines as well.  Whether those 
involved in the debates over religion and Darwin are aware of it or not, many arguments 
about the purported facts of Darwinian theory are not about fact or science at all but are 
about maintaining a particular metaphorical understanding of nature or evolution that is 
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consistent with the arguer’s beliefs.  The counter-metaphors examined in this study 
confirm this conclusion.  Though Gosse was a scientist purportedly offering a scientific 
case against geology, he did not really produce an empirical theory.  Instead, Gosse used 
his detailed scientific descriptions to develop a rhetorical defense of the idea that nature 
revealed God’s mind and perfect work.  Ultimately, the absence of a scientific theory 
was the primary reason that Omphalos was so completely rejected in the scientific 
world.  Similarly, Spurgeon claims in “Hideous Discovery” to be combating the 
scientific concept of evolution.  He insists that evolution has no proof—a term which 
attempts to take the discussion to an empirical realm—but Spurgeon’s discourse offers 
no scientific details.  Instead, Spurgeon relies solely on his metaphors, which evoke 
negative emotion in relation to evolution.   
 Metaphorical understandings of nature and evolution were prominent both before 
and after Darwin published the Origin; they continue into the present.  The ongoing 
presence of metaphor continues to influence the discourses surrounding evolution and 
the Christian faith.  I will conclude this study with a brief consideration of the ongoing 
presence of the metaphors of awe/wonder and of sin/destruction that were identified in 
the works of Gosse, Chesterton, and Spurgeon.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
 I have shown in this study that responses to the ideas of Darwinian evolution are 
largely about maintaining a particular metaphorical view of nature.  Those Christians 
contemporary with Darwin who resisted evolutionary theory, such as Gosse, Chesterton, 
and Spurgeon, produced their own counter-metaphors in the attempt to defend natural 
theology.  The metaphors identified here continue to influence the debates over Darwin 
within Christianity today.  Most prominently, Spurgeon’s metaphors of sin and 
destruction, which we have seen generate powerful emotional responses, have been very 
influential.  Spurgeon’s prominence and influence in his own day continues in many 
Christian circles today.  He is viewed by many as a model preacher and defender of the 
Bible.  Spurgeon’s sermons can be accessed in their entirety via the website of the 
Creation Science group Answers in Genesis. “Hideous Discovery” is quoted by the 
group’s founder on the same site (see Ham).  Based on Spurgeon’s continued 
prominence, it is not surprising that metaphors of sin/destruction in relation to evolution 
continue in Christian discourse.  For example, one prominent player in the current 
Darwin debates within Christianity claims that “[t]heistic evolution takes the Darwinian 
picture of the biological world and baptizes it” (qtd in Olasky 38).  The use of baptism in 
this quote continues the metaphorical connection of Darwin/evolution with sin and 
destruction, as baptism within the Christian tradition is associated with cleansing from 
sin.  The metaphor of sin and destruction continues to promote fear and total rejection as 
the appropriate response to evolution, as it did when Spurgeon used it.   
   67
 Likewise, metaphors of awe/wonder are notable in the ongoing debate over 
Darwin within Christianity today.  Frances Collins, a prominent promoter of theistic 
evolution and current president of the NIH, depicts the process of natural selection as 
“the language of God” written through the script of DNA (see Collins, Language).  For 
Collins, God speaks a language of wonder, and it is this language of wonder in the 
natural world that leads one to belief.  Another group, the Vibrant Dance Initiative, 
promotes “a gracious dialogue” by evangelical Christians on interpretations of Genesis 
and the role of Darwinian evolution (Vibrant, n.p.).  This group depicts science and faith 
as a “vibrant dance,” each working together to reveal the Truths of the world.  The 
image of a “vibrant dance” suggests beauty and grace and generates emotions of awe 
and wonder.    
The ongoing presence of the metaphors produced by Gosse, Chesterton, and 
Spurgeon suggests that twentieth century acceptance of the empirical facts of natural 
selection has not changed the metaphorical landscape of the debates about Darwin.  If 
we want to better understand the way in which people discourse about Darwinian 
evolution and its relation to matters of faith, we must identify the metaphors in which 
their discourse is rooted.  Once these metaphors are identified, the model of experienced 
metaphor can be used to analyze the emotional response these metaphors create, and 
thus their rhetorical implications.  Rhetoricians need to be recognized by scientists, 
theologians, politicians, and other contributors to the debates over Darwin as having a 
more prominent role within this seemingly intransigent debate.  While it is not the role 
of the rhetorician to settle disputes, they can offer a much greater understanding of the 
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way in which the debate about Darwinian evolution and Christianity is influenced by the 
presence of metaphorical language.   
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